The Canada Transport Security Board has published its final report in the July 2022 fire aboard the MV Holiday Island Ferry on the coast of Prince Eduardo Island, saying that it will launch an investigation of national security problems on vessel fires and emergency response practices to reduce the impact of future incidents.
This research “opens the door to a national conversation about boat fire safety to ensure that each person who passes aboard any ship in Canada can do so with confidence that the systems are in their place to protect them,” said the chair of the Board, Yoan Marier in a press release.
The TSB findings in the Holiday Island fire were presented during a press conference at Charlottetown, PEI, Wednesday.
Among other things, the Watchdog agency expressed concerns about the confusion of Transport Canada and Northumberland Ferries Limited, the ship’s operator, when the fire exploded when the Christmas island approached the dock in the wooden islands, on the southeast coast of PEI.
The report found that although Northumberland Ferries was responsible for operating the boat, Transport Canada retained responsibility, and the Federal Transport Minister acted as the “authorized representative” of the boat, the person legally responsible for the safety of the ship.
The report found that the personnel of both organizations were not clear about what implied the role of the authorized representative and who was responsible for key security and supervision tasks.
“The lack of clarity extended to critical areas such as operations, emergency repairs and supervision. Communications between the operator and the transport of Canada were informal, and the supervision of maintenance and the operations of the ships was limited,” said Marier.
‘There is still more to do’
Mark Wilson, president and CEO of Northumberland Ferries, said in a statement that the company welcomes the findings of the TSB.
He said that the NFL has already taken 16 corrective actions to improve its performance before the release of the report.
“These actions included improve our emergency training, review and update of procedures, and strengthen operational protocols,” Wilson said in the statement.
“We recognize that there is even more to do and we will work with Transport Canada to ensure that the reports of the report are implemented in a timely and effective way.”
What happened aboard Holiday Island?
The fire exploded in the Ferry machine room around 11 in the morning of July 22, 2022, approximately one hour after the ferry crossing from Caribú, NS, to wooden islands.
More than 200 people were evacuated from the ship. No injuries were reported.
The 50 -year -old Ferry had been scheduled for replacement in 2027, but had to be discarded early due to the extensive damage he suffered in the fire.
Ethienne Séguin-Bertrand, the main researcher and TSB security analyst, said the ship’s age was not a factor that contributes to the fire.
He said that the fire began after a non -standard repair in the Ferry fuel injection system failed, which causes the fuel to spray in the hot motor pieces and turns on.
The problem began with a small leak in the fuel rail of the main motor injection system. The crew initially patched it with the Board material and consulted the manufacturer’s representative while waiting for spare parts, said Séguin-Bertrand.
“The repairs continued to fail, so they continued to apply more temporary repairs,” he said.
“What is especially worrisome in this case is that there was no review of the Risk reviewed by the Ferry operator to take into account the additional risks that raised the presence of these temporary repairs on board.”
Long data problem
Marier pointed out that this is not the first time that TSB has marked concerns related to authorized representative role.
“If authorized representatives do not have a clear understanding of the scope of their responsibilities with respect to security, ships can operate without the minimum defenses provided by complying with regulatory requirements, and critical security obligations can be addressed or worse inadequately,” he said.
The Holiday Island fire was one of the almost 400 fires in commercial vessels reported to the TSB in the last decade. Since its inception 35 years ago, the Board has issued nine security concerns and 10 recommendations related to fire safety.
As a result of this latest research, the Board has issued a formal recommendation in Canada Transport that provides a detailed orientation for authorized representatives.
“This guide must support the authorized representatives to understand and comply with the applicable regulations, thus reducing the risks of vessels and crews that operate without the minimum security defenses that offer regulatory compliance,” said Marier.
Do not confuse luck with emergency preparation.– Yoan Marier, Canada Transportation Security Board
The investigation also found that the CO2 fire extinction unit of the Holiday Island machine room was not initially activated due to unclear instructions.
Although the crew believed that the system had committed, the suppression unit had not really registered. The delay allowed the fire to intensify.
“In addition, the machine room had not been completely sealed. As a result, when the CO2 finally released, it was probably dispersed and allowed oxygen to continue entering the space. This reduced the effectiveness of the suppression system and the fire continued burning.” Séguin-Bertrand said.
Thanks to crew efforts and lifeguards, the fire was contained in the Ferry machine room and no longer extended.
Marier pointed out that the emergency response was ultimately successful, but said that was largely due to luck.
“The fire exploded when the ship was close to the terminal. It was the light of day, the weather was manageable. The seas were calm. A modern evacuation system had been installed earlier that year, and the aid was close,” he said.
“We have said it before, and we are saying it again: you don’t confuse luck with emergency preparation.”
