It seems to be a cruel irony that the same force that was ever blamed for triggering a apocalypse now seeks atonement. Whether the Afghan-Soviet war would restructure the world order or not, it undoubtedly transformed this region, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan. Politics, after all, follows its own calculation: understanding when an ancient enemy becomes a strategic partner requires a dispassionate reading of interest and imperative.
In that context, Russia’s formal recognition of the Afghan Taliban regime should not be a surprise. But is this development full of contradictions? After all, these Taliban are the ideological descendants of Mujahideen that credit was attributed to defeat the Soviet Union. Pakistan also said that Legacy, and has had its consequences since then, with a compound interest. The militant groups that now threaten the security of Pakistan are the heirs of that jihadist lineage, and the policies of the Taliban suggest that they point to reinvent Pakistan through the prism of the turbulent of Afghanistan.
As for the United States, the overall example of pragmatic diplomacy, barely guarantees a lot of elaboration. For Washington, victory and defeat are tactical, not absolute moral maneuvers. He negotiated with the Taliban before his military withdrawal, offering tacit recognition even before his last soldier had moved away from Kabul.
Moscow’s signals of a change in politics had become increasingly visible in recent years. However, the moment of the formal recognition of Russia, in the midst of the consequences of the conflict in Israel-Iran, reveals a deeper anxiety: Russia is becoming more and more a marginal player in the southwest of the Asian geopolitics. In Syria, the Assad regime has been expelled. In Gaza, the humanitarian catastrophe is growing. Iran, the main regional ally of Russia, remains under siege. Meanwhile, Moscow’s responses are limited to rhetorical posture.
How much influence does Russia really have on the Taliban that you have formally recognized?
Even in Ukraine, Russia seems trapped. The president of the United States, Donald Trump, who sees geopolitics as a transactional theater and a war as a brand exercise, has relegated Moscow to a footnote. His public desire for a Nobel Peace Prize, a juxtaposed against global disturbances, adds a tragic element to the situation. For the Palestinians in Gaza, it is another chapter in a long history of betrayal, since they continue to suffer while the consciousness of the world remains inactive.
But returning to the central question: What does Russia expect to recognize the Taliban regime?
The movement is particularly disconcerting when seen through Iran’s lens. Tehran’s frustration with the Taliban has been growing. Some speculate that the silent response of the Taliban to the aggression of Israel, or perhaps their alignment perceived with the new Syrian leadership, especially the interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, who surprised the observers by getting involved with Trump and insinuating normalization with Israel, has worried Tehran. The new rulers of the Taliban and Syria share certain features: pragmatic diplomacy, ideological ambiguity and a desire to reposition themselves inside a changing geopolitical landscape.
This alignment has ramifications. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which shares the operational and ideological ties with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, has dismantled the ally of Tehran, the Assad regime, in Syria. Iran can also perceive these changes as weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon, hardening Israel’s aggressive position towards Tehran. Checking Iran’s concerns is the presence of anti-hear groups that operate from the Afghan soil, particularly the Jaish Al-Adl, which maintains a presence along the border between Pak-Iran.
For their part, the Taliban are becoming more and more pragmatic, as well as Syria’s new political elite. They are committed to all the main regional and global powers: China, Russia, the United States and India. Of these, China has the deepest bets. As an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan, Beijing is very aware that instability in Afghanistan could spill in his own territory.
That is why China has intensified its efforts to establish confidence construction channels between Kabul and Islamabad, with the aim of avoiding conflicts and containing terrorism. However, terrorism has been far from being contained. The Afghan floor continues to serve as a launch platform for attacks that bleed in Pakistan. Ironically, those who were once described as “good Taliban” or Pakistani powers have now turned their weapons into the state.
The recent suicide attack in Mir Ali, claimed by Aswad Al-Harb, a group linked to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur network, is emblematic of this change. A group alliance, including Lashkar-I-Islam, Tehreek-I-Inqilab-i-Islami and Ittehad-Ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, has intensified attacks in North and South Waziristan, as well as in urban areas such as Lakki Marwat, Tank and Kulachi. Meanwhile, the TTP has adopted a strategy focused on the systematic orientation of the police and government officials.
Despite the fact that both the HTS and the Afghan Taliban share characteristics in their diplomatic Oberturas and their political pragmatism, also diverge abruptly. Unlike HTS, the Taliban have not distanced themselves from the militant groups that once fought with them against NATO forces. Instead, they seem to be handling these groups, selectively using them against Pakistan. Perhaps Taliban leadership recognizes the lasting utility of proxy tools that can press adversaries while maintaining plausible denial.
Pakistan and Iran, more than any other actor, understand the dangers of such arrangements. Proxies can only meet strategic objectives to some extent; Beyond that, they develop their own agendas.
Some Afghan analysts argue that Pakistan’s growing assertiveness in regional policy and his growing interest in Central Asia have bcompulted the Taliban. They want to throw the image of being the proxy of anyone, even while they depend on the representatives to affirm the leverage.
Russia’s motivations to recognize the Taliban regime are clearer: a combination of Realpolitik and strategic opportunism. The objective is to counteract western influence, ensure its periphery and expand diplomatic commitment. Moscow also frames recognition as a step towards economic cooperation in energy, transport and infrastructure.
But it is still a critical question: how much influence does Russia really have on the Taliban on issues such as terrorism and the use of representatives against neighbors? This is a challenge that even China and Pakistan have not been able to solve. Meanwhile, Taliban leadership continues to play a careful game, balancing global expectations with local ambitions.
The writer is security analyst.
Posted in Dawn, July 6, 2025
