If one day is a long time in politics, so it is in diplomacy. The most surprising example of this is the extraordinary speed with which the special relationship between the United States and India has been unraveling. In February, the family warmth of what Narendra Modi described as a “mega party” was exhibited during his visit to the White House. The Indian prime minister was the second world leader that President Donald Trump was the host after his return to power. Both praised effusively, and Trump talked about his “special link” with Modi.
However, there were signs during the visit of the friction that was advanced. In the midst of hugs and handshakes, Trump criticized India for having some of the highest commercial rates in the world. Hours before Modi’s visit, Trump announced reciprocal tariffs to coincide with those collected by other countries of US products. He also said that India was “a difficult place to do business.” During the electoral campaign, he accused India of being “a great abuse” of commerce and made it clear that acting on tariffs would be his highest priority.
These signs of imminent problems were ignored or underestimated by New Delhi. Several rounds of commercial negotiations that followed were marked by strong differences, especially on American access to the highly protected agricultural and dairy sector from India. But the Indian side still hoped to reach an agreement with its largest commercial partner. Instead, Trump unleashed a flood of threats and invective against India, punishing him for his “unpleasant” commercial practices. In publications on social networks in X, he attacked India often in a hard language. Then, just before its deadline of August 1 to conclude trade agreements on reciprocal tariffs, announced the imposition of a 25 percent tax on Indian imports and a penalty not specified by the purchase of Petroleum India and Russian weapons. It also ruled out more conversations until the tariff dispute was resolved.
This left the government of Modi staggering in a state of the decision of additional rates, which he described as unjustified. Trump also threatened additional sanctions to India for being part of BRICS, which characterizes as anti -America. Trump then called India, along with Russia, as “dead economies.” Stating that the imports of oil from India in Russia were “feeding the war of Ukraine” and with stagnant commercial conversations, imposed additional tariffs of 25 pieces such as penalty, which raised them to 50 percent. India is Russia’s second largest oil importer, after China. More than a third of Indian crude oil imports come from Russia.
Trump’s coercive tariff actions have left India in a dilemma.
In less than six months, the strategic association between the two countries had become a serious crisis that was promoting it to a collapse. How did things get to this pass? There has been a lot of discussion in international media and the community of thought with analysts raising the question of whether this is a temporary error or a fundamental rearrangement of the relationship. Most of the analysis is reduced next to the latter, given the structural sources of their differences in a changing geopolitical environment.
Nueva Delhi seems to have made three errors of calculation and erroneous judgments that framed their policy and led to the poor management of the situation. One could not see that Trump’s overwhelming priority was trade and not strategic problems, such as India’s role in the containment of China’s United States, which New Delhi thought he would protect him from divergences about tariffs. The arrogance of India about its strategic importance for Washington, fed throughout the decades, blind to Indian officials to the consequences of tariff discord in the relationship. Nor could they recognize the use of Trump rates as a tool in search of geopolitical interests.
The second calculation error is related to the Indian-Pakistan crisis in May and repeated Trump statements that ended that conflict. Nueva Delhi denied vehement that the United States played a role, which contradicted both Trump and reality, and should demonstrate that relations with Washington.
The fact that Trump mentioned his role at least two dozen times was part of his effort to shine his credentials as “pacifier.” Modi himself declared “no country had mediated in Alto El Fuego.”
By repudiating Trump, Nueva Delhi antagonized the president of the United States, injured his ego and hardened his position, when he was already criticizing commercial policies and Russian links of India. It was also free how to recognize that the role would not have cost New Delhi much. He could still have reiterated his traditional opposition to any American mediation in Kashmir. The sudden warmth in relations between the United States and Pakistan also enraged New Delhi, so it is more stubborn by giving Trump credit for deactivating the crisis.
Three, New Delhi could not read the geopolitical calculations of a man who was turning almost all aspects of American foreign policy, without experience for past dynamics. For Trump, the value of India as “counterweight” to China did not seem to count much, especially because its transactional approach focused on hitting a great deal with China and not looking for an endless confrontation. As Ed Luce put it in the Financial TimesTrump “is getting rid of the fourth century of American politics to underpin India as a counterweight to China.” In Russia, the Indian government did not foresee that, frustrated by President Vladimir Putin in a high fire in Ukraine, the president of the United States Mercurial would turn and change his position, as well as harden his position in the countries they exchanged. The old New Delhi thought turned out to be an obstacle to understanding geopolitical changes, much less administering them.
This has left New Delhi in a link and struggle for a strategy to deal with Trump, which has little tolerance to “strategic autonomy” declared from India. Condemned the last US movement as “unfair, unjustified and irrational.” Until now, the Modi government has responded through expressions of nationalist rhetoric, withdrawing against the United States by continuing to buy Russia oil, saying that it will not compromise the interests of farmers and increasing commitment to China. The dilemma of India is that if you grant tariffs, you lose your face at home and give an advantage to the opposition that sees Trump’s actions as “economic blackmail.” If not, it runs the risk of lasting damage both to its economy and to relations with Washington. The ‘strategic alignment’ of the United States-India faces an uncertain and problematic future, for now.
The writer is a former ambassador to the United States, the United Kingdom and the UN.
Posted in Dawn, August 11, 2025
