In the midst of the many geopolitical changes in progress, the change in the Pak-United States relationship has reached some observers as particularly surprising. He has also caused questions about the extent to which this change indicates a genuine restart.
For at least two decades, Washington had largely adhered to a family script in Pakistan. That script rested in two western narratives: an alleged double game in Afghanistan and the unfavorable closeness of the country with China. That script also became more difficult to rewrite, since the successive US administrations made a hard axis for the Indo-Pacific and advanced a case for India as a net safety provider in the belief that eventually erosion could erode the incentives of New Delhi for strategic autonomy.
But in recent months, it has changed a lot. After years, Islamabad seems to have some capital with an American administration. The United States has demonstrated a growing willingness to reject Pakistan with India. And the general attitude of the United States towards the latter, born, at least on paper, for frustration for trade and immigration, but also due to lack of recognition of President Donald Trump’s role in the end of the four -day conflict of May, it has been much more great.
To what extent is Washington’s script in Pakistan suffered a genuine rewriting?
Has there been a genuine restart in ties?
The examination of the feeling up and down of Washington suggests that some caution on this front could be wise. A generation of American diplomats and officials, many of which amounted to Obama and had a front row for the un controlled objectives of the United States in Afghanistan, are still widely pro-India. And years of close participation with the strategic community of India have also made American political leaders more in tune with the understanding of India’s complaints against Pakistan, instead of Pakistan Indian.
It is worth taking into account this for two reasons:
One, given that the default configuration in Washington below the Executive’s level is what it is, it can be prudent to prepare for the contingency that, when the pendulum recedes, there may be a struggle to compensate and placate New Delhi for what will probably be seen as the improper excesses of Trump-Trump-was in southern Asia.
Two, despite its new closeness with the Trump administration, Pakistan’s own limitations make Islamabad be unlikely to be exclusively in an American camp. If the Trump administration presses Pakistan to distance from China, Pakistan may probably experience the friction of the type that India is experiencing on his ties with Russia. For these reasons, Pakistan has an enormously high participation in continuous Chinese-American cooperation.
That said, recent events still have three consistent openings that policy formulators in Islamabad could do well to take advantage.
First, events in the Middle East have diverted much of Washington’s attention away from the Indo-Pacific and back to Western Asia. This, together with the recent agreement of Pakistan with Saudi Arabia and regional efforts to end the war in Gaza, make Pakistan, more than India, the regional protagonist most consistent in the quieter work of anchoring geopolitical stability. That, by default, improves the bets of the United States in the reaffirmation of the united pak-states relationship and should strengthen Pakistan’s imperative to remain an important interlocutor in the Middle East.
Secondly, it cannot be denied that India’s trust in its relationship with the United States has been shaken. Even when a commercial agreement between the two countries is reached, Indian strategists can doubt the doubt of attaching weight to future Oberturas outside Washington. This presents a somewhat rare window for Islamabad to strengthen its offer for a strategic stance of the most balanced United States in southern Asia.
Thirdly, if Pakistan can continue with conscience its joint investments proposed in critical minerals, commerce and energy during the rest of Trump’s time in office, visibility and dividends of these companies could encourage political support for bilateral collaboration in the next US administration. It is also likely that the more the American crack persists with New Delhi, the less likely such collaborations with Pakistan are considered prohibitive costs.
Finally, it is worth remembering that any truly significant restart with the United States is sustainable and is not linked to short -term gain, Pakistan must first be able to guarantee in a credible way the returns of democratic, social and economic governance at home. If you can, everything else will remain much more naturally.
The writer is an assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Tufts, USA.
Posted in Dawn, October 3, 2025
